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1. Introduction  
During the summer 2013 on the Economist appeared several articles bringing good news 
about crime rates. Crime is dropping systematically in all rich countries despite the financial 
crisis and the following economic depression. The magazine reports about cases of 
tremendous improving: “In New York, the area around Times Square on 42nd Street, where 
pornographers once mingled with muggers, is now a family oriented tourist trap. On 
London’s housing estates, children play in concrete corridors once used by heroin addicts to 
shoot up. In Tallinn you can walk home from the theatre unmolested as late as you like”. 
Once upon a time in America things were very different. At the beginning of the nineties, 
after a period of dramatic growth in violent crimes in the seventies and a following decade of 
sustained homicide, doubling those of the sixties, criminologists and public opinion worried 
about the future. Many prominent voices in the US at the beginning of the nineties were 
largely pessimistic about the near future. John Di Iulio (1996, p. 8) wrote: “it is not 
inconceivable that the demographic surge of the next 10 years will bring with it young male 
criminals who make the . . . Bloods and Crips look tame by comparison”. Pessimism reigned 
not only among social scientists. President Clinton’s expectations about the future were quite 
apocalyptic: “we’ve got about six years to turn this juvenile crime thing around, or our 
country is going to be living with chaos”. 
As we know, the evolution of crime rates in the United States turned out to be very 
different from the pessimistic forecasts. Indeed, crime rate significantly dropped since 1990 
(Blumstein and Wallman, 2000; Levitt, 2004; Zimring, 2006; Harcourt, 2011). The recent 
wrong forecasts about the evolution of crime rates in the United States calls into question the 
economic and criminological professions on the ability to understand which factors impact on 
crime and the interpretation of official crime statistics. Before addressing causality issues on 
what causes crime, one crucial question is what we can infer about crime rates and trends 
from official statistics. The evolution of crime over time and space is very volatile. This trend 
and general volatility in crime rates may be due to several factors ranging from changes in 
victims’ reporting behavior and recording and administrative procedures, to changes in the 
underlying determinants of criminal behaviors (Cook and Khmilevska, 2005). 
An important caveat in interpreting and analyzing the evolution of crime rates refers to 
the difficulty in forecasting what it could happen in the near future. To this extent, we should 
be cautious in being optimistic on how crime rates will be in the near future. Before making 
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forecasts, with an eye towards the recent past, we should also question if crime rates actually 
dropped in all rich countries as the Economist and many other commentators reported. In fact, 
despite the apparent dramatic drop in crime over the two last decades, crime remains at the 
top of the major concerns of citizens in developed countries. As it emerges by national social 
and victimization surveys, crime is considered one of the most serious problems faced at the 
nations level (Bianchi, Buonanno and Pinotti, 2012). While a systematic discrepancy between 
trends on concerns about crime and effective crime rates is possible in theory, there is an 
obvious and simple explanation of why citizens are worried about crime. Unlike homicides, 
all other crime rates, as reported in official statistics, might suffer from some systematic 
measurement errors. Behind the apparent declining crime rates there might be a change in the 
propensity to report crimes or changes in the classification systems of crime categories. If this 
is the case, no effective decline has been in act in the recent years and the good news reported 
above are just artifacts of underreporting. 
In this paper we take a cross-country perspective to study these issues. Our first 
objective is to investigate to which extent crime rates are declining in some major developed 
countries. Specifically, we look at the evolution of crime rates across the two sides of the 
Atlantic, namely United States and European countries between the 1970 and 2010.‡ A cross-
country perspective is useful insofar we can learn if the apparent decline in crime rates is a 
global pattern. In doing this, we question the reliability of official crime statistics in assessing 
the trends in crime rates and some crucial factors impacting on criminal activity. A careful 
approach at the descriptive and inferential level has been suggested in the last years by several 
prominent scholars (Aebi, 2004; Dills et al., 2008; Goldberger and Rosenfeld, 2009; Durlauf 
et al., 2010): crime is a complex and by nature hidden social phenomenon and data need a 
careful inspection. While in other critical policy sectors data are collected systematically both 
at national and international level, descriptive information on crime trends across countries 
are not uniformly and systematically collected.  
Our benchmark is the previous work in Buonanno et al. (2011) that performed a cross-
country comparison of crime rates by using the same countries we consider in this paper. 
Buonanno et al. (2011) documented a “reversal of misfortunes” between the two sides of the 
Atlantic, namely that both property and violent crimes (with the exception of homicides) are 
now more widespread in Europe than in the United States, while the opposite was true thirty 
                                                
‡ In this paper, as in Buonanno et al. (2011), by Europe we mean Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. Although this choice is primarily driven by data availability, these seven 
countries account for more than 80% of the pre-2004 population of the current European Union, with an 
aggregate population above 300 million – a figure comparable to the US population. 
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years ago. As largely discussed in Buonanno et al. (2011), existing crime data show that the 
US experienced an unexpected drop in crime rates after 1990, while in Europe crime rates 
have been on the rise since at least 1970 and crime rate is today higher in Europe than in the 
US. Note that this fact is not in contradiction with the figures that we have reported at the 
outset of this paper. Aggregate crime rates are apparently going down in Europe nowadays 
but still, given the raise they faced until the end of the nineties and then the relative stability, 
they are still higher in Europe than in the US. This fact is consistent across several categories 
of crime. Figures 1 shows the dynamics of total crime rate, violent crime rate, robbery rate, 
burglary rate, car theft rate and homicide rate in the US and in Europe§  
 
Figure 1: Evolution of crime rates in the US and in Europe 
 
 
We start our analysis of the evolution of crime trends by questioning the findings 
reported in Buonanno et al. (2011) through the adoption of a conservative and careful 
approach. Thus, as it is standard in the crime literature, when underreporting might be a 
concern, in our analysis we will compare trends in homicide and other crime rates. Unlike any 
other type of crime, homicides should not be affected by underreporting. Moreover, in a 
                                                
§ A detailed discussion of the data sources of the crime data is presented in section 2.  
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cross-country comparison, potential changes in classification systems should not impact on 
the measure of homicides. The careful comparison of homicides and other crime rates time 
series can be particularly useful to reveal measurement problems affecting recorded crime 
rates. As for the “reversal of misfortunes”, the graphical evidence provided significantly 
varies when we consider homicide rate. From Figure 1 we observe that, unlike any other type 
of crime, despite it halves since 1990, US homicide rate remains 5 times higher than the 
corresponding one in EU. More importantly, it appears that in the EU homicide rate is more 
stable over time, although the figure, as we will show later, masks substantial heterogeneity in 
the patterns of homicides across EU countries.**  
As it will be clear in the rest of the paper, for the US the evolution of homicides 
parallels that of any other crime category, including the total crime rate used in our previous 
work. This suggests that measurement error when considering the evolution of total crime rate 
in the US is not a big issue: homicides as well as other types of crime as registered by official 
statistics are declining. For the European countries, however, we cannot draw the same 
conclusion: the trend in homicides does not parallel the one displayed by other crime rates 
and this, in principle, could cast some doubt on the reliability of official crime statistics. Shall 
we then dismiss any analysis based on aggregate crime data from European countries as 
something that we cannot trust? While measurement error (due, for example, to misreporting 
or under-reporting) in other crime rates in European countries is a potentially valid 
explanation, in order to reconcile the divergent trends between crime and homicide rates, 
there is another plausible explanation that goes as follows. In the US homicides might reflect 
overall criminal activity because other crimes are more likely to turn into a homicide, while 
this might not be the case in Europe. One plausible reason underlying this argument is related 
to the diffusion and use of guns and firearms in the US that are likely to be related to 
variations in homicides (Duggan, 2001; Cook and Ludwig, 2006).  
The second part of the paper is devoted to disentangle these two alternative explanations 
(namely, measurement error and different underlying structural factors causing crime and 
homicides across EU countries). As a first step, we start analyzing the impact on crime rates 
of three main potential factors traditionally studied in the criminology and economics 
literature, namely incarceration rates, age structure of the population and unemployment. The 
choice of these potential explanatory factors relies both on the standard model of economics 
of crime (Becker, 1968) and on previous evidence (Levitt, 2004, Buonanno and Raphael, 
                                                
** It is worth noticing that spikes in EU homicide trend are due to mafia wars in Italy. 
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2013, and Drago, Galbiati and Vertova, 2009). The channels through which these variables 
may affect crime are well known. The demographic structure of the population is important 
because different age groups show different baseline engagement in illegal activities. Young 
males, for instance, are disproportionately more likely to commit a crime than women or 
seniors. Incarceration may have both a deterrent and an incapacitation effect (Buonanno and 
Raphael, 2013 and Drago, Galbiati and Vertova, 2009 provide some quasi-experimental 
evidence on these effects) as well as criminogenic effects (Drago, Galbiati and Vertova, 2011 
and Nagin et al. 2009). Finally, unemployment might affect individual’s criminal activity by 
lowering the opportunity cost of illegal behavior with respect to legal sources of income. The 
findings reported in the previous work of Buonanno et al. (2011) show that different trends in 
incarceration are able to explain a large part of the “reversal of misfortunes” between the US 
and EU countries, with age structure and unemployment playing a limited role.†† 
Despite the intuitive possible links between these factors and crime, identifying their 
causal effect is challenging. In particular, a bunch of unobserved factors may affect both 
crime and its potential determinants by making causal inference difficult. Given the 
identification challenges that might be particularly severe in a cross-country analysis, we opt 
for a conservative identification strategy mimicking the one adopted in previous work 
(Buonanno et al 2011). First, in addition to the inclusion of country and year fixed effects we 
allow for flexible deterministic country-specific time trends. Such an approach helps to 
account for correlations induced by unobserved time effects, although they may remove 
structural correlations as well – this is why we call this approach conservative. Second, given 
the identification issues related to the effect of incarceration on crime rate, we propose an 
instrumental variable approach that allows us to break the simultaneity in the prison-crime 
relationship. Indeed, we may expect prison population to be higher where crime is higher too, 
and this simple fact would hamper the identification of the direction of causality. Specifically, 
in this work we address the endogeneity problems related to the use of incarceration by using 
amnesties and collective pardons as instruments for prison population. Collective clemencies 
have been quite common in Europe (particularly in France and Italy) and lead to a significant 
release of inmates during certain years for reasons that are mostly political and so are 
arguably unrelated to crime rates (Barbarino and Mastrobuoni, 2013; Drago, Galbiati and 
Vertova, 2009).  
                                                
†† It is worth noting that this simple fact does not imply that incarceration is desirable or efficient and might be 
explained both by larger incapacitation and deterrent effects. 
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Under the set of identifying assumptions that we will discuss more in detail in the 
following sections, our cross-country analysis is able to shed some light on the different crime 
trends in Europe and in the US both for homicides and crime rates. First, when we consider 
the total crime rate, we have a positive and statistically impact of the incarceration rate, while 
unemployment and age structure have a limited impact. The elasticity of crime rate to 
incarceration is about 0.4, meaning that an increase, for example, in the incarceration rate by 
10 percent is associated to a decrease of 4 percent in the crime. These results are essentially 
the same when we exclude from the regression the US, consistently with the idea that the in 
the US and the EU countries crime rate responds to the same factors, at least as far as 
unemployment, age structure and incarceration are concerned. When we consider homicides 
rate, none of the factors are statistically significant, suggesting that, taken together, crime 
rates and homicide rates in our eight different countries follow different trends. These results 
change when we exclude from our regression the US. Specifically, homicides rates respond to 
unemployment and age structure, consistent with the idea that homicides in the US and the 
EU countries respond to different factors. Overall, while we cannot exclude that the trends in 
crime rates in the EU countries are affected by measurement error (e.g. caused by 
misreporting), the differential response of homicides and crime rates in EU with respect to 
standard factors such as unemployment, age structure and incarceration finds support in the 
data. In the paper we provide a possible interpretation of these differences among US and EU. 
In particular, we test the role played by firearms in explaining the parallel evolution between 
crime rates and homicide rate in the US. The idea is simple; when firearms are more easily 
available it is more likely that they are used both by criminals and victims respectively as a 
mean to perpetrate a crime or as a way to protect private safety and property. As widely 
discussed in the existing literature gun ownership is significantly and positively related to 
changes in the homicide rate (Duggan, 2001; Cook and Ludwig, 2006). In summary, the 
discussion previous findings and our evidence suggest that this is most plausible explanation 
of why unlike the United States, homicides follow a different trend in EU countries.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we widely discuss similarities 
and differences in crime trends between the US and Europe. The empirical methodology and 
findings are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Crime trends  
2.1 Measuring crime  
Measuring crime is a challenging and crucial task since it is a necessary condition for a 
correct assessment its determinants and then for the formulation of crime control policies. In a 
cross-country framework, there are several issues to consider. First, reported crimes 
underestimate the true (unobserved) number of committed crimes. This fact may be a source 
of bias in inferential analysis. In particular, measurement error can bias the estimates of the 
effect of those determinants of criminal activity that are correlated with the extent of under 
reporting. In fact, especially for minor crimes such as petty crimes, there are many reasons 
inducing citizens not to report crime to the police. Anecdotal evidence suggests that people do 
not report crime because sometimes they blame themselves for having being victimized or 
because they fear stigmatization from peers or from the police officers. In many other 
circumstances, people do not report to the police crime because they consider the crime 
suffered as minor and not too serious to be reported or because the monetary value involved is 
little. Usually, trust in the ability of the police to find a criminal and to investigate is also a 
driving force of the reporting rate. Many other reasons determine the reporting rate, and these 
factors may have differential impacts in different countries. A full investigation of the issue is 
an interesting task for future research. In the context of our application, it is important to note 
that the underreporting problem is very relevant: in the sample of countries and years 
considered the range of variation is between the 37 and the 70 percent.  
This problem is well known in the economic and criminological literature. When doing 
inferential analysis, a standard way to deal with this problem is using logarithms of crime 
rates and exploiting the longitudinal structure of data, when available, by including 
geographical and time fixed effects (see, for instance, Ehrlich, 1996; Levitt, 1996; Gould et 
al., 2002; Oster and Agell, 2007 and Fougère et al., 2009). The use of logarithms alleviates 
the under-reporting problem by reducing the potential skewness of the distribution in crime 
data determined by a few (measured with error) outliers and at the same time make it easy the 
interpretation of the estimated impact in term of elasticity, as we will discuss in greater detail 
later. The inclusion of geographical and time fixed effects sweeps out from the inferential 
analysis measurement errors that are constant within space (over time) or within time (across 
space). Namely, if Italians have a lower propensity to report crimes and this propensity does 
not vary over time, the inferential analysis is able to take into account this when we estimate 
the impact of a series of factors on crime.  
9 
 
As widely discussed in the criminological literature (see Aebi, 2004; Aebi and Linde, 
2010) reported crime to police, despite being not an appropriate instrument for the study of 
cross-national differences in crime levels, offer a reasonably valid basis to study the evolution 
and the trend in crime trends under the assumption that reporting and recording procedures 
have not experienced substantial changes. Still, in the light of the reporting rates over time 
(see below) even in the same countries, we recommend to be cautious in using reported crime 
to police as a measure to study cross-national differences in crime levels. Specifically, the 
main issue is the heterogeneity of reporting rates across space and time. Reporting rates differ 
across countries and vary over time in a non-uniform way, as it is suggested by comparing 
victimization surveys data with official crime reported to the police (see, for instance, Soares, 
2002 and VanDijk, Van Kesteren, and Smith, 2007). Van Dijk, Van Kesteren, and Smith 
(2007) estimate that the rate of reporting to the police in the US was 57% in 1988 and 49% in 
2004. The corresponding rates in Europe were 63% and 61% in Germany, 71% and 59% in 
the UK, 62% and 54% in France, 36% and 47% in Spain, 42% (in 1991) and 50% in Italy.  
Another problem in using criminal statistics is related to crime classification. Indeed, 
the classification of crimes may vary across countries, because of different criminal codes. 
For instance, an act that is a property crime in country A may be classified as a violent crime 
in country B. More seriously, the crime system classification may change over time in the 
same country. As a consequence, if one wants to work with a homogeneous measure of crime 
rates across these different countries, it is required to use a measure that is unaffected both by 
underreporting and classification issues. No statistical remedy can be found in this case, in 
both the inferential and descriptive analysis. 
A standard approach both in the economic and criminological literature is to rely on 
homicide rate. The popularity of this approach is mainly due to the fact that under reporting is 
negligible for homicides and homicides tend to be more uniformly classified across countries. 
Despite this obvious advantage of the homicide measure, we could question whether 
homicide rate represents a credible measure for crime rates in general. In other words, the use 
of murder is meaningful under the assumption that the evolution of murder rate follows the 
same patterns of other types of crime; otherwise we might be tempted to argue that the 
determinants of homicides differ from the determinants of other crimes. 
For all these reasons, we consider several measures of crime discussing the pros and the 
cons of each measure considered in our analysis. The two main variables we consider in our 
analysis are the total number of homicide reported to the police per 100,000 inhabitants as 
main measure of criminal activity, and the total number of crimes (of any kind) recorded by 
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the police per 100,000 inhabitants that we use in Buonanno et al. (2011). In addition, we 
consider also more detailed crime category: burglary, robbery and car theft.  
Our panel dataset comprises annual observations at country level for Austria, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, UK and USA over the period from 1970 to 2010. As 
discussed in the previous section, crime data come from the crime statistics that are recorded 
by the police. Data have been collected from official national sources and from Eurostat for 
EU countries and from UCR for the US.‡‡ The total number of homicides comes from 
national police statistics.§§ Our dataset also includes a set of socio-economic and demographic 
variables that are likely to be correlated with crime rates. Demographic variables include the 
share of men aged 15-34 years and the unemployment rate coming from OECD statistics. 
Finally, we include incarceration rate coming from official national sources. Summary 
statistics are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
Unemployment rate 328 7.29 4.28 .57 24.17 
Burglary rate 185 510.97 398.193 14.00 1,670.24 
Robbery rate 175 127.57 73.50 5.515 271.85 
Car theft rate 173 380.59 206.67 61.38 1,125.11 
Violent crime rate 160 600.25 495.47 53.01 2,155.98 
Total crime rate 318 5,483.0 2,087.81 1,017.87 11,031.96 
Homicide rate 280 2.25 2.41 .24 10.14 
Incarceration rate 295 133.77 156.58 21.75 762.88 
FSS 41 56.05 3.45 50.14 61.10 
Fraction of young males 328 14.79 1.35 11.50 17.70 
 
The measures of crime considered, despite aiming at providing a comprehensive 
analysis of the evolution of crime rate over time and space, may offer a different picture due 
to some peculiarities of the measure itself. For instance, report rate for car theft tend to be 
very high in every country for reasons related to insurance coverage and to personal liability 
and responsibility while robbery and burglary rate present a much lower reporting rate with 
significant differences across countries. The analysis of the evolution of the different 
measures of crime rates considered together with an inferential analysis may shed light on the 
underlying differences and determinants of crime. 
 
                                                
‡‡ http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/crime/data/database 
§§ Only Spanish data are drawn from cause of death statistics. 
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2.2. Crime in Europe and in the US: trends comparison  
As stressed in Buonanno et al. (2011), Figure 1 reveals three important facts: 
a) Crime rates in Europe increased sharply from 1970 to 1990; the total crime rate 
stabilized afterwards, with property crimes decreasing since the early 2000s and 
violent crimes increasing steadily (with a few exceptions); 
b) Crime rates in the US increased from 1970 to 1980, have no obvious trend in the 
1980s and decline sharply in the 1990s. The rate of decline is less sharp from 2000 
onward;  
c) Crime rates in the US were above the corresponding rates in Europe in 1970, but they 
have been below European levels in recent years (with a few exceptions for property 
crime). 
We termed this pattern as the “reversal of misfortunes” in crime rates. In this section we aim 
at looking more in depth at crime trends. In particular, we are interested in understanding how 
crime rates evolve over time and what we can learn from comparing the evolution of 
homicide against total crime and other crime categories both in a single country and in a 
cross-country setting. Two crucial aspects should be understood from this analysis.  
First, by comparing the evolution of homicides (which should not be subject to 
measurement error) and another crime category, say burglary, we can learn if both crimes are 
likely affected by the same structural factors.*** If homicides and burglaries have parallel 
trends, we should understand if the socio-economic factors impacting burglaries impact in the 
same way homicides. If they do not exhibit parallel trends, then there are two not-mutually 
exhaustive explanations: a) some underlying factors have different impacts on the two crime 
categories, b) the measurement error in measuring the crime categories other than homicides 
change over time within the same country.  
Second, if we want to look at the evolution of crime trends across countries, finding 
parallel trends for homicides and other crime categories for each country, would lend support 
for the use of official crime data for the analysis of the evolution of crime across different 
countries. For example, if homicides exhibit parallel trends with total crime rates in any 
country, then the “reversal of misfortunes” in crime rates between the United States and the 
European countries would be supported by further descriptive evidence.  
                                                
*** In principle, although it is unlikely to happen, it is possible that the two types of crime have parallel trends 
and still be affected by different factors. An example may be useful to clarify this point. Assume that socio-
economic factors A and B have a positive impact on crime x and that crime x and y have parallel trends. A and B 
should have the same impact on crime y and x, unless changes in A and B are compensated by idiosyncratic 
shocks in way that  
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Our graphical analysis aims at studying in depth the relationship between crime rates and 
homicides in order to shed light on the determinants of crime patterns over time. In figure 2, 
we compare the evolution of a set of crime rates (total crime, burglary, robbery and car theft) 
together with the evolution of homicide rate for the US over the period 1970 to 2010. Even 
from simple eyeballing, it clearly emerges how crime rates and homicide rates tend to move 
in parallel exhibiting an almost identical trend, suggesting that the determinants that are 
responsible for the drop in homicide can be in principle also responsible for a generalized 
drop in crime rates.  
Figure 2: Crime rate trends in the US (1970-2010) 
 
Figures 3-10 present the same exercise for EU and every single EU country considered 
in our sample. When we consider EU as a whole, we observe that total crime rates and 
homicide rates show some similarities in their evolution over time, even if the two trends 











Figure 3: Total crime rate vs homicide rate in EU (1970-2010) 
 
When we consider each EU country, we obtain a more heterogeneous picture. With a 
few exceptions, homicides do not follow a parallel trend with respect to other types of crimes 
in European countries. One natural explanation is that homicides in European countries are 
more volatile. In fact, being lower by a factor of five with respect to the United States, 
homicides in European countries are potentially subject to large variation with respect to other 
crimes. This is to say that parallel trends as those reported for the United States would be 
more difficult to observe in European countries. In the UK, for example, a closer look (Figure 
7, first panel) suggest that homicides and total crime follow a similar trend, although this is 
not confirmed when we disaggregate by types of crime. Having said this, we note, however, 
that in most of the cases homicides and other types of crime exhibit divergent trends. In 
Austria, for example, robberies go up from the mid nineties’ until 2007 while homicides with 
some positive and negative spikes, on average, go down. Many other examples can be found 
from these figures. In summary, while for the United States we have that homicides and other 
types of crime evolve together, this is not the case in Europe. What conclusions can be drawn 
from this descriptive analysis for the European? In reality no conclusion can be suggested at 
this stage of the analysis. Strong measurement error in measuring the crime categories other 
than homicides or different factors having differential impact on crime and homicides are 
equally plausible explanations.  
In Section 4, we will try to understand which factors influence crime and homicides. As 
we will see later, this analysis will help us to interpret the patterns suggested by the figures 





3. Conceptual framework and empirical analysis 
In the second part of the paper we assess the influence of some socio-economic variables on 
crime rates. The exercise aims at identifying the effect of the “suspects” holding all else 
constant (ceteris paribus assumption). As it is well explained in a paper by Cook and 
Khmilevska (2005) on this journal, this approach is grounded in the experimental method. In 
experimental sciences the factor of interest is artificially isolated through the experimental 
intervention. While more and more popular in other social sciences and sub-fields in 
economics (e.g. education and development) controlled experiments are rarely possible in 
criminology or economics of crime for the very nature of the phenomena analyzed. 
Nonetheless, under some assumption modern econometric techniques make it possible to 
assess the effect of one or more factors holding all else equal from non-experimental data. 
Therefore, by holding all else equal our regression analysis is aimed at identifying causal 
effects and will try to disentangle causality from spurious correlation. This kind of exercise is 
clearly relevant from a policy point of view: when a policy maker is able to manipulate a 
variable (e.g. incarceration), we should expect a variation in crime only if there is a causal 
link between incarceration and crime, whereas no effect is expected when incarceration and 
crime are correlated because they are caused by common factors. In this respect, the policy 
relevance of this causal analysis is higher for the variables that are under the control of policy 
makers.  
When we come to choose the role of which factors we should focus on we are called to 
make a choice among a long and well-established list of “usual suspects”. Discussing the role 
of each of them and how previous literature treated them is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Hereafter we make the choice to focus on how criminal activity is affected by incarceration 
rates, age structure of the population and unemployment rates. There are different reasons for 
which we choose these three and not many other factors. First, the measurement of 
incarceration, unemployment and age structure is less likely to be affected by measurement 
error. Second, all these three factors are recorded and available from official statistics in the 
countries we analyze. Third, by including too many variables in the model, we increase the 
risk of obtaining “biased” estimates and to violate the ceteris paribus assumption.  
Once we have chosen and measured the relevant factors we want to analyze assessing 
their causal impact is far from obvious. The reason is straightforward, incarceration, 
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unemployment and age structure move together. The challenge is then to find an empirical 
design where reasons (sources) of variation in one variable do not cause also changes in other 
variables (observables and not observables). This is the point of contact between regression 
analysis and the experimental method: finding a way to isolate the part of variation in 
observational data that is not correlated (move together) with other variables.  
In the rest of this section we discuss the relevance of our three variables (incarceration, 
age structure and unemployment) with reference to the economic model of crime and the 
criminological literature. Then we describe our identification strategy, that is how we isolate 
the effects of one variable from the others, and discuss in detail the critical assumptions 
behind the estimation. Finally, we present and discuss the results relating them to the 
descriptive statistics shown in the previous sections.  
 
 
3.1 Age structure 
The choice of age structure as an explicative variable is straightforward. It is well in fact a 
well established fact in criminology that young males are statistically more likely to be 
offenders than any other demographic group. For example, Levitt and Lochner (2001) note 
that 18-year-old individuals are five times more likely to be arrested for a property crime in 
the United States than their 35-year-old counter-parts. For violent crime this ratio is 2:1. The 
same authors document that in 1997 those between 15 and 19 years old constituted 7% of the 
population but accounted for over 20% of arrests for violent offences. In our previous work 
Buonanno et al. (2011) we have shown how the age structure of the male affects crime rates 
and explains part of the reversal of misfortunes described in that work. In this paper we will 
use the share of males between 15 and 34 years old as an explanatory variable. Luckily 
enough, ceteris paribus analysis using with this variable does not require searching for 
plausible sources of exogenous variation that mimic the experimental ideal. Indeed, in a given 
year and country the share of males at that age is pre-determined with respect to other factors 
potentially affecting crime rates varying in that year and place: the share of males in of that 
age in the population is plausibly determined by variation of the social and economic 
conditions between 15 and 34 years before. As long as variations in these factors between two 
and three decades ago do not directly affect crime rates today we can identify the effect of the 




3.2 Unemployment  
The motivation to use the unemployment rate mainly hinges on the economic model of crime 
(Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973). Unemployment rate proxies for the general level of prosperity 
and the economic conditions in each country and thus, for legitimate and illegitimate earning 
opportunities (Ehrlich 1973). According to the standard economic model of crime (Becker, 
1968), individuals choose between criminal and legal activities on the basis of the expected 
utility of each. In this simple framework, returns to legal activity are determined by the 
market earnings (wages for workers and profits for self-employed) whereas returns to illegal 
activity depend on the potential crime payoff and the expected sanctions imposed by the 
criminal justice system. Individuals will choose to engage in criminal activities, or increase 
their engagement if they are already involved, if the expected return to criminal activity 
outweighs the expected return to legal activities. This simple framework is very helpful to pin 
down the potential effects of variations in unemployment rates on crime. An increase in 
unemployment, holding all else constant, should favor an increase in crime rates because it 
reduces the opportunity cost of starting or increasing an illegal activity (i.e. the forgone legal 
profits are lower during an unemployment spell). These predictions are consistent with 
previous research on the effects of unemployment on crime (e.g. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 
2001; Lin, 2008) showing that an increase in unemployment favors a raise in criminal 
activity. It is worth noting that such a different theoretical model of behavior might imply 
different conclusions. For instance, some criminologist (e.g. Cantor and Land, 1985) have 
argued that there might be forces going in the opposite direction favoring a reduction in crime 
as a consequence of an unemployment spell during economic downturns. Based on ‘routine 
activities theory’ the argument goes as follows: in the period immediately following their job 
loss the unemployed are less likely to be in public places where the risk of being victimized is 
greater and are more likely to be guardians for their residences. Paternoster and Bushway 
(2001) discuss this aspects in greater detail, nevertheless here it is worth remarking that since 
such models predict a an impact of unemployment on crime having an opposite sign with 
respect to the economic model an empirical analysis able to disentangle the causal effect of 
unemployment is necessary to evaluate what is the prevalent effect.  
The argument just developed holds for property crimes, when we want to understand 
the unemployment-violent crime link some caveat is needed. In this case the overall impact of 
unemployment also depends on the how the income drop following job losses affects 
criminogenic commodities’ consumption. When the latter increases we might find that violent 
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crimes positively correlate with higher unemployment. Moreover, homicides, the main 
category of violent crime analyzed here, can be more related to economically motivated 
crimes, often being a by-product of property crime. Therefore, it is even more interesting to 
understand if homicides respond to variation in unemployment rate. In fact, in the United 
States, and to some extent in Netherlands and France, homicides parallels the trend of other 
property crimes such as car thefts, suggesting that both crimes may have the same underlying 
socio-economic determinants. 
All in all, determining the sign of the relation between unemployment and crime is far 
from obvious and a crucial empirical challenge.  
 
3.3 Incarceration rate 
The last variable to discuss is the incarceration rate. Theoretically, the impact of the prison 
population on crime rates should be interpreted as the sum of two effects: deterrence (a large 
prison population implies a high probability of incarceration for potential criminals) and 
incapacitation (people who are locked-in cannot commit crimes). The first effect assumes 
that, consistently with the economic model of criminal behavior, potential criminals respond 
to incentives, the second is a simple constraint/lock-in effect. Although it is not possible to 
distinguish between deterrence and incapacitation in a reduced-form framework, the effect of 
the prison population is of interest because the severity of punishment is a variable that can be 
directly manipulated by policy-makers. It is worth noting that what we are estimating here is 
the short-run effect of incarceration (as it will be clear later we are evaluating the 
contemporaneous incarceration/crime link in our econometric model). In order to evaluate the 
overall dynamic impact of incarceration on crime we would need to assess also the long rune 
effects of incarceration on ex-post behavior of former inmates. A recent literature suggests in 
fact that prisons have dynamic criminogenic effect on former inmates (Drago et al 2011; 
Drago and Galbiati, 2012; Bayer et al., 2011; Chen and Shapiro, 2007; Nagin et al. 2009). A 
comprehensive evaluation exercise is nonetheless unfeasible with the data we have, hence we 
focus hereafter on the contemporaneous/short-run effects of incarceration on crime rates. 
The effect of incarceration on crime is particularly interesting to study in the context of 
comparative analysis. As extensively discussed in Buonanno et al. (2011), the most striking 
difference between Europe and the US in the policies related to crime is about the 
incarceration rates. Although there is some heterogeneity in the incarceration patterns across 
the seven European countries we are considering and despite the overall dynamic is similar to 
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the US, nowhere in Europe are incarceration rates comparable to what we see in America. 
Mass incarceration in the United States is one of the most important political, social and 
economic issues in the last century. With more than 2 million of prisoners, the United States 
have about the 25 percent of the world prison population. The American incarceration rate is 
between about times the European one. About 1 percent of the American adult population is 
incarcerated. According to Levitt (2004), the prison population was one of the main factors 
explaining the decline in crime rates in the US during the 1990s: this variable accounts for 
12% of the reduction in homicides and violent crimes from 1991 to 2001.  
 
3.4 Statistical model   
In this section we introduce the model we estimate and then we’ll present the main empirical 
findings. 
Let i be the country and t the year in our sample. We estimate the effects of 
incarceration, unemployment and age structure on criminal activity (total crime rate or 
homicide rate) by assuming that the process generating the data we use can be modeled as 
follows:  
 
crimeit = λi + β1 (incarceration)it-1 + β2 (fraction of males 15-24)it + β3 (unemployment)it + αt + 
tλi + µit,        (1) 
 
where all variables are in per capita terms. Note that unlike the fraction of young males 
and the unemployment rate, the effect of the incarceration rate is lagged one period.††† The 
coefficients of interest that we estimate are β1, β2 and β3, which are the partial derivatives of 
incarceration rate, age structure and unemployment rate with respect to crime. The estimated 
coefficients indicate the marginal change in the crime rate followed by a change in the 
variable of interest, holding the other variables constant. The longitudinal structure of the data 
allows us to include the country fixed effects λi and time fixed effects αt. Specifically, country 
fix effects are a set of dummy variables (for each country) that absorb the effect of any 
unobserved variable remaining fix at the country level that might affect crime rates. Times 
fixed effect instead absorb the influence of unobserved factors that commonly affect crime at 
a given moment in time (year in our set up). To give an example, if for any reason citizens in 
                                                
††† This is a conservative modeling choice is dictated by the fact that incarceration and crime rates are registered 
annually. Thus we cannot impute variation of crime rates to people that might be incarcerated at the moment of 
crime data registration. Note however that all the results are not sensible to this choice. 
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Italy have a higher propensity to commit crime than in Austria, this propensity, as long as 
does not vary over time in the two countries, is absorbed by the country fixed effect. 
Similarly, if in one particular year crime was higher in all countries for any reason, this is 
taken into account by the year fixed effect. Operationally, by including country and year fixed 
effects we subtract from each variable (crime, incarceration, age structure and unemployment 
rate) its average value calculated at year and at the country level. This implies that we 
estimate the coefficients of interests from deviations of incarceration, age structure and 
unemployment from their average value at the year and country level.  
We also include country-specific time trends tλi, where t is a polynomial of fourth order 
in time. The idea is similar to the country fixed effect. In this case, however, it is as if we 
allowed the country fixed effect to vary over time in a deterministic way. This removes slow-
moving changes occurring in a specific country throughout the period of analysis. As 
discussed in the previous section, reporting rate tend to vary over time exhibiting a modest 
change in the period considered. Thus, time trends are likely to capture these differences in 
reporting rate over time within country. Again, the estimated coefficients on the three main 
variables are estimated by deviations from these trends too, namely using the remaining 
variation after these time trends are included. Including country specific time trends is quite 
common in longitudinal analysis. This is to avoid that the dynamics of crime rate is wrongly 
interpreted as caused by some explanatory variable that moves along a trend correlated 
(because of other underlying forces) with the trends of the dependent variable. In other words, 
a country-specific time trend removes spurious correlation. Of course, the choice of the order 
of the polynomial in time (in this case it is of fourth order) is to some extent always arbitrary. 
We choose a quartic trend and not, for example, a linear, quadratic or cubic trend, on the basis 
of an accurate analysis indicating that the quartic trend in the context of this application is the 
most appropriate one.‡‡‡  
Finally, µit, which we term as the error term, represents the unobservable characteristics 
that vary by country and by year. This term collects all the variables that we omit from the 
model and that potentially have an effect on crime, for example, police forces or urban 
density.  
 
3.5 Identification   
                                                
‡‡‡ In Buonanno et al. (2011) we present all technical aspects justifying this modeling choice. We refer to the 
discussion reported there for those interesting in further details. 
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The assumption needed to identify the coefficient of interests as causal effects is that once we 
control for the set of fixed effects and country-specific time trend, the remaining variation in 
the independent variables is exogenous. By exogenous we mean that the remaining variation 
in the data is as if it is generated by an experiment. Under this hypothesis we are thus able to 
tell apart the effect of the candidate explicative factors ceteris paribus. This assumption is 
reflected in the error term µit. Specifically, we assume that any unobservable or omitted 
characteristic from the model impacting on crime is not correlated with our three key 
variables. It is apparent that since we include in or model regression our set of fixed effects 
and country-specific time trends, in order to bias our estimates, such an omitted variable 
should vary by country and by time and should not be absorbed by the specific-country time 
trends.  
Given this identification strategy, the main remaining concern refers to the incarceration 
rate. In fact, as we have already mentioned above, the age structure is predetermined with 
respect to crime that at least 15 year before. As for the unemployment rate that is a slow-
moving variable, the country-specific time trends should remove common trends with the 
crime rate that are correlated to other factors. For what concerns the incarceration rate instead 
potential confounding factors (correlating both with incarceration and crime rates) are not 
removed necessarily removed by the set of fixed effects and country-specific time trends. In 
order to overcome this threat to identification we employ an instrumental variable strategy. 
The thought experiment here is to consider another variable (the instrument) that is correlated 
with the incarceration rate but is not directly correlated with the crime rate. If such an 
instrumental variable exists, then this variable can be used as exogenous source of variation 
for the incarceration rate. As in our previous work, in the context of this application, we use 
amnesties and collective pardons as instrument for the incarceration rate. Collective 
clemencies are quite common in Europe (particularly in France and Italy) and lead to a 
significant release of inmates during certain years for reasons that are mostly political and so 
are arguably unrelated to crime rates (Barbarino and Mastrobuoni, 2013; Drago et al., 2009). 
Many of the collective pardons and amnesties implemented by European countries between 
1970 and 2008 were officially motivated by either political or humanitarian reasons. 
Specifically we have one amnesty in Austria (1995), five in France (1980, 1981, 1985, 1988, 
1995), two in Germany (1997, 1997), seven in Italy (1970, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1990, 2003, 
2006), and three in Spain (1975, 1976, 1977).§§§ Thus, we solve our identification problem by 
                                                
§§§ Table 1 in Buonanno et al (2011) also reports the description and the motivation of each amnesty.  
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instrumenting population at time t–1 in a given country with a dummy that is equal to one if 
in the same year (t–1) an amnesty was passed in that country.  
 
3.6 Results 
As it is common in the empirical literature, when we bring our model to the data, we express 
all variables (crime, incarceration, fraction of males and unemployment) in logs. This 
transformation renders the distribution of the variables less skewed and the coefficients 
interpretable as elasticity (namely, the ratio of the percentage change in the variable of 
interest to the percentage change in the crime rate). We present our OLS estimates in Table I, 
while instrumental variable estimates are shown in Table II.  
In column 1 we present the results of the regression with the total crime rate as the 
dependent variable for all countries. The incarceration rate exerts a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient on total crime rate. The estimate implies annual elasticity of total crime 
rate with respect to incarceration rate of -0.40. This estimate is in line with the literature 
(Levitt, 1996; Drago et al. 2009). As for the fraction of young males and the unemployment 
rate, consistently with the literature, the coefficients are positive. However, they are not 
statistically different from zero. The picture does not change when we exclude (column 2) the 
United States from the regression. In columns 3 and 4 we present regressions results for 
homicide for the entire sample and for EU, respectively. Also in this case the incarceration 
rate shows a negative and statistically significant effect at the 5% confidence level. It is worth 
noting that when we exclude the United States from the regression (column 4), the fraction 
males and the unemployment rate are larger and more precisely estimated, suggesting that 
both the demographic composition and the labor market opportunities play a relevant role in 
affecting crime rates. 
As we have discussed above, the key empirical difficulty in interpreting the impact of 
incarceration rate on crime rate is the direction of causality, since it is likely that this 
relationship may be spurious or biased. Thus, in order to adequately address that issue in 
Table II we present instrumental variables estimates, where incarceration rate is instrumented 
with amnesties and pardons. IV results are consistent with OLS estimates for both total crime 
and homicides. Nevertheless, IV estimates for homicides (columns 3 and 4) are less precisely 




These results speak to the descriptive evidence presented in the previous sections. Total 
crime rates respond to the same factors whether or not we take all countries as a whole. 
Homicide rate responds differently if we exclude the United States. Moreover, the factors 
influencing homicides in European countries are different from the factors influencing total 
crime in the same countries (comparing, for example, columns 2 and 4). Taken together, these 
results are consistent with the explanation according to which homicide and total crime in 
European countries do not follow parallel trends.  
 
Table 2: OLS estimates for total crime and homicide rate 
  
Total crime All 
countries 






 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
-0.3983*** -0.4075*** -0.4043* -0.4401** Incarceration rate (0.0496) (0.0617) (0.1808) (0.1654) 
     
1.1797 2.2288 2.1118 5.5268* Fraction of young 
males (1.6120) (1.3629) (4.4726) (2.7134) 
     
0.0616 0.0529 0.1798 0.2326** Unemployment 
rate (0.0339) (0.0371) (0.1098) (0.0637) 
     
     
Observations 278 240 246 208 
R-squared 0.9861 0.9877 0.9788 0.9237 
Countries 8 7 8 7 
     
 
Table 3: IV estimates for total crime and homicide rate 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
-0.4329** -0.4773** -0.3568 -0.3710 Incarceration rate (0.1621) (0.1572) (0.3363) (0.4695) 
     
1.2257 2.3329 2.2308 5.6269* Fraction of young 
males (1.6956) (1.4219) (4.4496) (2.4387) 
     
0.0601 0.0473 0.1684 0.2296*** Unemployment rate (0.0352) (0.0427) (0.1012) (0.0548) 
     
Observations 278 240 246 208 
R-squared 0.9861 0.9876 0.9787 0.9173 
Countries 8 7 8 7 




At this point of the analysis it is natural asking why do we observe parallel trends in the 
United States between homicide and total crime rate? An in depth analysis of this issue goes 
beyond the scope of this paper and would make the object of an interesting analysis. 
Nonetheless here we explore one particular aspect: the potential role played by firearms. The 
idea is simple; when firearms are more easily available it is more likely that they are used 
both by criminals and victims respectively as a mean to perpetrate a crime or as a way to 
protect private safety and property. UCR statistics provide compelling evidence about the use 
of guns in committing crime. In particular, official statistics showed that firearms were used 
in 67.7 percent of the US murders, 41.3 percent of robberies, and 21.2 percent of aggravated 
assaults. This evidence might explain part of the correlation between homicides and other 
crimes in the US. On the other side of the Atlantic, given a much stricter regulation in guns 
possession we expect a lower correlation between homicides and other crimes in Europe. 
Such a hypothesis is consistent with previous literature. McDowall (1986) found little 
relationship between total robbery rates and gun density, but a strong cyclical relationship 
between gun density and the fraction of robberies committed with a gun. More recently, 
Duggan (2001) examines the relationship between gun ownership and crime demonstrating 
that changes in gun ownership are significantly and positively related to changes in the 
homicide rate, while a less marked effect is found for all other crime categories. Cook and 
Ludwig (2006), using county- and state-level panels for 20 years, estimate the elasticity of 
homicide with respect to gun prevalence as between 0.1 and 0.3. 
In order to investigate this hypothesis, hereafter we perform a simple analysis that 
allows us to test whether the parallel trend between total crime rate and homicide rate survive 
once we account for the use of firearms. 
The measurement of gun prevalence is subject to several issues. Indeed, as stressed in 
Cook and Ludwig (2006) administrative data on firearms ownership are not reliable or 
general available and household surveys data, despite being the only direct source of 
information on gun ownership, are not always available or reliable. Thus, alternative proxy 
for gun prevalence has been used in the literature. In particular, the more popular proxy is the 
fraction of suicides committed with a firearm (FSS) (Azrael et al., 2004; Kleck, 2004). For 
our exercise, we collected FSS at the national level for the US over the period 1968 to 2010. 
Our basic empirical approach is to estimate the relationship between total crime rate and 
gun prevalence over a 40-year period. We regress the log total crime rate against FSS. FSS is 
lagged by one period to take into account concern for reverse causation (Duggan, 2001; Cook 
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and Ludwig, 2006). We computed the unexplained part of the relationship between total 
crime rate and firearms by computing the residual. Thus, we test whether the component of 
total crime rate not explain by firearms is parallel to homicide rate.  
As shown in figure 11, that presents the final step of our exercise, it emerges that the 
parallel trend existing between total crime rate and homicide rate disappears. This result 
confirms the potential role played by firearms. In our view this is an important and interesting 
finding despite being a preliminary one. Future research should try to further explore this 
fascinating issue and to pin down the mechanism relating homicides and other crime rates. 





In this paper we discuss the evolution of crime patterns on the two sides of the Atlantic over 
40 years starting from 1970. In doing this we investigate the reliability of the data coming 
from official crime statistics in performing a cross-country analysis of the crime trends. In 
Europe and the United States, the dynamics of crime rates, despite presenting some 
similarities (i.e. a general drop in recent years), is significantly different over several 
dimensions. Crime rate in the US, after a dramatic increase until the nineties, has experienced 
a tremendous drop in the following decades, while crime rates in Europe has kept increasing 
up to 2000 showing a modest drop in the last decade.  
The main aim of our contribution is to shed light on these substantial differences in 
crime trends between US and EU by exploring some of the channels that could help us in 
understanding these differences. First, we address a potential measurement problem. The 
starting point of our analysis indeed stressed that there’s some discrepancy between the 
apparent evolution of crime rates and people perception. Such a discrepancy should alert the 
researcher about the possibility that the apparent decline in crime rates observed in the very 
last years is indeed an artifact driven by measurement error which is caused by substantial 
variation in victims’ under reporting behavior. But if systematic and sizeable measurement 
errors exists, how can the researcher trust the overall measures of crime along such a long 
period? This calls into question the validity of crime rate statistics, not only in our cross-
country analysis but also in all other police reports, studies, newspaper articles and academic 
papers showing the evolution of crime trends.
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Following the criminological literature, in order to address this basic problem we have 
adopted the approach of resorting to the use of homicides rates as a potential measure of 
crime. Homicides’ indeed, contrary to other kind of crimes, do not suffer (or suffer much less) 
from under reporting. Such an approach led us to uncover some interesting pattern. In 
particular while homicides and other crime rates follow the same trends in the US, this is not 
true in Europe. Such a discrepancy might be due to several factors. One obvious candidate 
explanation is that while in the US homicides and other crimes are caused by some common 
factor, in Europe they respond to different causes. In order to investigate this potential 
explanation and to better understand the role of some of the usual suspects driving crime 
rates, we performed a standard econometric analysis that is able to isolate the causal 
component of the correlation between crime and its potential explanatory variables from other 
confounding factors. Specifically, we have estimated the impact of the fraction of young 
males, the unemployment rate and the incarceration rate on crime. Our results indicate that 
incarceration decreases total crime as reported by official statistics in Europe and the United 
States, whereas no or limited role is observed for the unemployment and incarceration rate. 
As for the homicides, we find no role of incarceration and a positive impact of unemployment 
and the fraction of young males, but only for the European countries. On the whole, we find 
support for the hypothesis that in the US homicides and other crimes are caused by some 
common factors, whereas in Europe they respond to different causes.  
Interestingly enough, this is case in which an econometric analysis is able to inform the 
interpretation of the parallel and divergent trends of crime and homicides in the United States 
and Europe, respectively. In fact, while we cannot exclude that underreporting still affects 
European data on all types of crime so that crime and homicides exhibit differential trends, we 
find support in the data for an explanation based on the fact that homicides and crime in 
Europe respond to different factors. On the whole, a conclusion we may draw is that, unlike in 
the United States, homicides are not a good proxy for the general level of crime in Europe.  
We have tried to understand what drives the common trend between homicides and 
other crimes in the US. In such an exercise it is natural asking what is the role played by guns 
and firearms. As we have discussed above in fact in the US, but not in other countries, the 
wide diffusion of firearms might imply that other crimes are more likely to turn into a 
homicide. Thus, we have presented some explorative regression analysis of the log total crime 
rate against the rate of suicides committed with a firearm (used as a proxy of firearms 
availability). We computed the unexplained part of the relationship between total crime rate 
and firearms. Then we tested whether the component of total crime rate not explained by 
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firearms is parallel to homicide rate. Our results show that the parallel trend existing between 
total crime rate and homicide rate disappears when we take the role of firearms into account. 
This result confirms the potential role played by firearms. 
All in all, this paper provides some useful cross country comparison and shows that it is 
possible with some caveat to use aggregate crime statistics to make sound inference on the 
role of factors affecting crime rates. Finally it opens some interesting research questions on 
the reliability of official crime statistics and the role of underreporting across countries. In this 
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Figure 10: Crime rate trends in the Netherlands (1970-2010) 
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